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The paper addresses the widespread pattern of exempting heavily polluting industries from 
greenhouse gas emission taxes. Two groups of explanations of exemptions are outlined. 
The first group focuses on the economic importance of exempted industries as the main 
explanatory factor. The second group of explanations is centered on factors that influence 
the political power and influence of emission intensive industries. These two groups of 
explanations are applied to understand the varying patterns of exemptions in Norway, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. It is argued that while some emission-intensive industries in 
Norway and the Netherlands are largely exempted from taxes, Danish emission-intensive 
industries enjoy exemptions to a more limited extent. This contrast is tried explained by 
applying explanations based on the economic importance and the political power and 
influence of these industries. The paper concludes that explanations based on the 
economic importance of exempted industries are very important to make us able to 
understand variations of exemptions. However, explanations based on factors that 
influence the political power of the exempted industries should also be investigated. In 
many cases, these factors supplement explanations based on economic importance, and in 
some cases produce outcomes that explanations based on the industry’s economic 
importance fail to account for.  
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1. Introduction 
Taxation of emissions of polluting substances has become an increasingly popular 
environmental policy instrument in Europe. This is partly because of the superior 
economic and administrative efficiency of taxes, and partly because of the positive 
employment benefits expected from using increased revenue from environmental taxes to 
reduce labour taxes (Weale, 1992, EEA 1996, OECD, 1997, Speck, 1999). 
However, the widespread practice of exempting large-scale polluters from taxes has 
become a major problem (Ekins and Speck, 1999). Considerations for economic and 
environmental efficiency justify the implementation of uniform taxes including all 
polluters and pollutants (Ekins and Speck, 1999). In spite of this, decision-maker worries 
about economic competitiveness and employment in polluting sectors as well as the high 
political bargaining power of individual companies and business organisations in many 
cases lead to reduced taxes or outright exemptions for big polluters. However, there is a 
considerable lack of studies of the economic and political mechanisms behind the 
emergence of environmental tax exemptions. Decision-makers who justify exemptions by 
pointing to considerations for economic competitiveness may also be motivated by 
considerations for the political costs of taxing polluting companies or branches, even 
though they justify their decisions by referring to economic considerations. Thus, more 
research is needed to evaluate economic and political motives. 
In the following, I will discuss some experiences with tax exemptions for energy-intensive 
industries in three environmentally ambitious northern European states. These states are 
the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. All three states have introduced ambitious 
taxation plans to curb emissions of greenhouse gases. In addition to these environmental 
policy similarities, all three countries also share important economic similarities. They are 
small, open economies which are crucially dependent on trade and sustained international 
competitiveness. Thus, competitiveness arguments are paramount for all three states.  
There is, nevertheless, a striking contrast of outcome between the three cases. While 
Norway and the Netherlands provide some energy-intensive industries with tax 
exemptions, Denmark has chosen not to exempt their energy-intensive industries totally 
from a carbon tax. Moreover, although Danish companies enjoy relatively generous tax 
rebates, they are forced to enter strict agreements on energy-saving with the government. 
Thus, there is a considerable contrast in policy outcome between Denmark and the two 
other cases. My ambition in this paper is to suggest an explanation of this contrast. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews alternative explanations of 
exemptions from the literature. The various patterns of exemptions in the three choses 
cases are described in section 3. In section 4, I discuss alternative explanations, while 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Varying exemptions – political or economic motives? 
The conventional view is that environmental policy differences are caused by 
considerations for economic gains and losses (Sprinz & Vaahoranta, 1994). If energy-
intensive industries are important for important economic parameters like employment, 
exports or GDP, governments may be disinterested in exposing those industries to 
environmental taxes and following reductions of international competitiveness. A classical 
argument here is that losses of competitiveness will emerge because high taxes on 
polluting companies will motivate these companies to transfer their production to other 
countries with lower environmental taxes. Thus, decision-makers may think that the 
efficiency gains from a flat tax may be outmatched by losses caused by bankruptcies in 
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polluting sectors. This dilemma may be particularly troublesome for states which are 
heavily dependent on polluting exports. Although revenue from the tax may be recycled to 
other sectors in the domestic economy, it may be difficult to replace lost export revenue in 
the short term. 
A complementary or challenging view is that tax exemptions are caused by the fact that 
exempted companies or sectors control political resources other than pure “economic 
weight” that make them particularly important for decision-makers. Such resources may 
be voter preferences or particular ideological preferences for polluting industrial sectors or 
even a culturally given aversion of conflict held by government agencies or political 
parties. It is well-known that specific economic sectors are able to negotiate exemptions 
from government regulation out of proportion with their economic ”weight”. By exploiting 
political resources like rural electoral support and access to the shaping of policy-maker 
preferences, sectors like agriculture have enjoyed regulatory privileges for long periods in 
various countries (Daugbjerg, 1998a). Such relationships often emerge as a consequence 
of long-standing relationships between governments and economic sectors and following 
high levels of institutionalised cooperation. Energy-intensive industries may have 
privileged access to governments for at least two reasons.  
First, energy intensive industries are well-established industrial branches frequently 
perceived as strategically important for economic development or defence. Thus, such 
industries may benefit from institutionalised links with state bodies like ministries of 
energy.  
Second, energy intensive industries are industries that emerged at the same historical 
junctures as important employers’ and employee organisations and cooperating political 
parties. Thus, there may be strong links between employers unions, trade unions, their 
allied parties and energy intensive industries. These historically based links may provide 
energy-intensive industries with privileged influence over decision-making. 
In addition, policy styles and political culture may play an important role in increasing 
industry influence (Howlett, 1991, Crepaz , 1995). To regulate energy intensive industries, 
which tend to be well-organised, a government must tolerate a certain level of political 
conflict. If the policy style and political culture is highly conflict-aversive, regulation that 
implies challenging well-organised and resourceful groups may become difficult for a 
government. 
To summarise: the conventional view on regulatory variation takes its point of departure 
in the national economic costs of regulation (in this case, variations in exemptions). A 
view which also focuses on the taxed industries’ political resources challenges or 
supplements this hypothesis by suggesting political and institutional variations that may 
contribute to explain regulatory contrasts. Above, I have particularly focused on networks 
linking energy-intensive industries with government bodies as well as powerful industrial 
organisations. In addition, policy styles and political cultures, which may favour well-
organised groups directly or indirectly, may influence regulatory outcomes. 
3. Emission taxes as climate policy instruments – three cases. 
It does not come unexpected that some of the states which are recognised as the 
”greenest” states in Europe are also among the forerunners when it comes to 
implementing carbon taxes (Ringius, 1999). In the following, I will present and discuss 
some of the main characteristics of carbon taxation in three such countries; Norway, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. I will focus particularly on the pattern of exemptions.  
A main conclusion is that while Norway and the Netherlands have permitted extensive 
exemptions for energy-intensive industries, Denmark has treated these industries with less 
generosity. Thus there is an interesting contrast in policy outcome that deserves analysis. 
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A second interesting contrast emerges in the Norway case. Here, full tax exemptions are 
provided to some energy-intensive industries which are of moderate macro-economic 
importance, while the main export industry, petroleum production, has been charged with 
a high CO2-tax. 
 
The Netherlands – covenants and benchmarking as main instruments – taxes as 
supplements 
Dutch policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are characterised by communication 
and mutual adaptation between the government and important sectors or “target groups”. 
The special Dutch history of societal organisation according to religious “pillars” 
facilitates such a compromise-oriented approach (Arentsen, undated).  
Taxation efforts in the Netherlands emerged through a very complex process of 
evaluation, intra-governmental negotiations and negotiations with interest groups, typical 
for the Dutch “negotiating” style of policy formation (Ligteringen, 1999). One important 
yardstick was the report from the Wolfson-committee of economic experts which was 
presented in 1992.  In this report, it was concluded that in the absence of a tax at the EU 
level, a domestic tax should be limited to households and small consumers due to its 
potential negative effects on energy intensive branches, which are very important in the 
Dutch economy (Wageningen 1998, NOVEM 1999a). While Dutch employers organised 
in the powerful employers union VNO-NCW protested against any tax measures along 
with officials in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the idea of a unilateral Dutch small-
scale energy-tax was promoted by the government in the Second National Environmental 
Policy Plan published in December 1993  (Wageningen 1998, p. 24). The tax was 
perceived as a main instrument to make the Netherlands fulfil its planned 3 percent 
reduction of CO2-emissions before 2000 (Ligteringen 1999, p. 269). 
After the so-called “purple coalition” including the Liberal Party, Labour and Democrats 
66 formed a new cabinet following the 1994 elections, the tax proposal was upheld. While 
the Liberal Party was in opposition to an energy tax, it accepted the proposal in exchange 
for other concessions in the coalition agreement (Ligteringen 1999, p. 271).  However, in 
this process, the size of the tax was reduced substantially as compared with the 
alternatives investigated by the Wolfson committee (Ligteringen 1999, p. 273). This 
committee had investigated a tax which involved 50-100 percent energy price increases, 
while the price increases following the tax finally selected ended up somewhere between 
15 and 25 percent (Ligteringen 1999, 273). 
The new tax was introduced on 1 January 1996. For electricity, the first 800 kWh were not 
taxed. Electricity consumption exceeding 800 kWh is subject to a tax of NLG 0,035 per 
kWh. For natural gas consumption in excess of 800 m3, a tax of NLG 0,038 per m3 was 
levied. Consumption above 50.000 kWh and 170.000 m3 was decided to be tax free; 
exempting energy-intensive industries from tax on a very large share of their consumption. 
The energy distributors collect taxes. The tax has been somewhat revised after 1996 as 
rates have been increased, and will continue to increase in the future as part of a more 











Table 1: The Dutch regulatory energy tax 2000 
Natural gas m3-annual 
consumption 
NLG/ m3  Electricity kWh- 
annual consumption 
NLG/kWh 
 0-800  0    0-800 0 
 800-5.000 0,02082    800-10.000 0,0820 
 5.000-170.000 0,01144   10.000-50.000 0,0354 
 170.000-1.000.000 0,00154   50.000-10.000.000 0,0048 
 Above 1.000.000 0   Above 10.000.000 0 
Source: Ministerie van Finanzen (1999) 
Exemption limits as well as steps of taxation were changed in 1998 (VROM 2000). 
Although the introduction of this tax provoked fierce protests from Dutch industries, this 
tax regime leaves the large heavy industries of the Netherlands mainly untaxed. 
A main reason for this is that the Dutch energy tax must be seen as a subordinate and 
complimentary instrument to covenants, which is the main climate policy regulatory 
instrument vs. Dutch industries. The covenant approach in the Netherlands was 
developed during discussion between the largely pro-industry Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the large, emission-intensive Dutch chemical industry in the late 1980s 
(Wageningen, 1998, p. 20). The topic of these discussions was how industries could 
contribute voluntarily to meeting Dutch climate policy targets. In the discussions, it was 
clear that in the absence of voluntary measures, a tax could be applied (Wageningen 1998, 
p. 20). The model which emerged in the course of this process was the so-called long-term 
agreements on energy efficiency. It had been calculated that to achieve the 2000 target of 
a three percent reduction of CO2-emissions, a 20 percent increase in industrial energy 
efficiency was necessary (Wageningen, 1998, p. 20). While the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and Environment supported direct limitations of emissions, both the 
industry and the Ministry of Economic affairs preferred energy efficiency targets 
(Wageningen, 1998, p. 19). Such targets are advantageous for the industry, as they allow 
for growing production as long as it is made with less energy per unit. 
Voluntary agreements have been applied to several industrial and service sector branches 
after 1992. Their popularity among industries has been bolstered by the fact that many 
energy-saving investments for industries are subsidised or receive tax breaks through 
various government programmes. According to Wageningen (1998, p. 23), average annual 
subsidies and tax breaks in the 1990-2000 period were 65 millions Euro. Covenants are 
certainly also popular among industries because they are informal in character, and have 
no sanctions attached in case of violation (Glasbergen, 1998). 
The covenant approach has recently been refined by the so-called “benchmarking” 
covenants. Energy-intensive industry installations consuming more than 0,5 PJ of energy 
each year are eligible for these covenants (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999).  
According to this covenant, signed in July 1999, Dutch energy-intensive industries are 
obliged to take part or remain among the best in the world in terms of energy efficiency 
not later than 2012. The covenant permits that targets may be met by using “flexible 
instruments” like CDM or joint implementation. The covenant will be evaluated in 2004 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999). In exchange for signing this covenant, the energy-
intensive industries have received future exemptions from taxes and other instruments. 
The effects of the covenants on other factors than energy efficiency are clouded with 
uncertainty. According to Wageningen (1998) as well as Enevoldsen (2000), the 
covenants have been accompanied by rapid expansion especially in the successful 
chemical industries. Thus, as a climate policy tool, it has been relatively ineffective as the 
energy efficiency effects have been neutralised by vigorous industrial expansion 
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(Wageningen, 1998, Enevoldsen, 2000). One Dutch observer even held the possibility 
open that the advantageous benchmarking covenants could make the Netherlands an 
attractive location for relocation of energy-intensive industries.1 It is not surprising that 
Dutch employers are very satisfied with this covenant.2 
Thus, altogether, the Dutch regulatory system favours energy-intensive industries strongly 
in comparison with less energy-intensive industries and consumers. The combination of 
virtually full tax exemptions, the voluntary, informal character of the covenants and the 
numerous industrial energy-efficiency subsidies makes it appropriate to say that the Dutch 
regulatory system provides much stronger incentives for emission reduction to smaller 
companies and consumers as compared with polluting and energy-intensive industries.  
 
Norway – full tax exemptions for energy intensive industries 
Norwegian policies to limit domestic emissions of greenhouse gases were characterised by 
vigorous taxation efforts in the early 1990s. Taxes and economic instruments in general 
were seen as key instruments to meet a 1989 parliamentary commitment to stabilise 
Norwegian CO2-emissions on that year’s level by 2000 (Reitan, 1998a, p. 6). 
Environmental taxes had been presented as a promising option for Norway’s policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in several government-sponsored studies (Reitan, 1998a, 
b). In spite of mounting scepticism in the business sector, Norwegian governments 
introduced important new environmental taxes in the early 1990s. The centre-right 
government (1989-90) proposed CO2-taxes on mineral oil and gasoline. Although this 
proposal was not consistent with the principle of taxing according to the concentration of 
pollutants in emissions, the proposal was presented as representing only a first step 
(Reitan, 1998b, p. 124). 
The minority Labour government, which took over in late 1990, broadened the 
environmental tax proposal. The new government proposed to tax emissions from 
petroleum production on the Norwegian continental shelf. The government managed to 
attract the support of a majority in the Parliament for this proposal. The new taxes were 
implemented from 1991. They included a CO2-tax on mineral oil of NOK 0,3/litre, and a 
tax on gasoline of NOK 0,6/litre. In addition, a tax of NOK 0,6/m3 of natural gas and per 
litre oil was applied to the petroleum producers on the continental shelf (Reitan,1998b, p. 
126). Coal for energy purposes was taxed with NOK 0,35/kg (Reitan,1998b, p. 126). The 
tax system was inconsistent regarding content of CO2 in the various fuels, but it was 
marketed as a first step. 
A main business source of CO2-emissions, the metal-producing industry, was exempted. 
Although Norwegian metal producers use hydro-electricity for energy purposes, they 
consume large quantities of coal in the production process. 
During the economic crisis of 1992, taxes for some selected industries (pulp and paper, 
herring meal) were decided reduced with 50 percent (Reitan 1998b, p. 142-143). Although 
an increase of CO2-taxes was planned during the 1990s, no substantial increases did 
emerge. Most interestingly, the exemptions for metal-producing industries became 
permanent. There was an attempt by the Green Tax Commission, an expert committee 
appointed by the government, to propose imposing a modest CO2-tax (NOK 50/tonne) on 
the metalworking industries and mainland burning of natural gas in 1996. However, the 
government appointed members of the committee were instructed by the Norwegian 
government not to propose this; an act which provoked a political scandal in 1996 
(Reitan 1998, b). 
                                                 
1 Interview with Drs. Henk Leemreize, FNV (Federation of Dutch Trade Unions), March 
2000. 
2 Interview with executives at VNO-NCW, March 2000. 
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In 1997, a new Norwegian minority coalition government took office. This government 
proposed a modest tax of NOK 100 per tonne of CO2 on coal for the energy intensive 
industries.3 Previously exempted industries, mainly the metal industries, were offered a 
gradually declining refund of their tax expenses until 2010. However, the government was 
defeated by a majority in Parliament, which instead instructed the government to start a 
study of a system of quotas for the industry. Such a system would open the door for 
distribution of free or very cheap quotas to the industry. This implicit subsidy had several 
advantages for the emission-intensive industry.  A free or cheap quota for CO2-emissions 
would be more permanent than a direct subsidy to cover tax expenses, and it would not 
emerge as an explicit subsidy in public budgets.4 The costs would instead be carried 
permanently by other economic sectors, which would have to pay higher prices for their 
quotas or still have to pay a tax. The report from the expert committee about a tradable 
quota system has been delivered to the government, but it has not yet been presented to 
the Parliament. In the meantime, the old tax system established between 1991 and 1993 
still prevails with some adjustments. The taxes are the following: 
 
Table 2: Taxes on fossil fuels for the Norwegian industry - 2000 
Fuel type Tax rate - NOK 
Mineral oil 0,54/kg 
Coal and coke 0,47/kg 
Oil or gas burnt as a fuel on the continental 
shelf 
0,70/Sm3 or kg 
Exempted from tax: Use of coal and coke as a raw material and use of coal and coke for 
processes (metal-industries, some chemical industries). Use of coal for energy in cement-
production. Mainland burning of natural gas. Fishing boats. 
Reduced rate: Fishmeal and pulp and paper production. 
Source: Stortingsproposisjon Nr. 54 1997-98, Website of Ministry of Finance: 
http://odin.dep.no/fin/engelsk/p4500279/p4500285/index-b-n-a.html 
 
In practice, this system implies that the Norwegian system of CO2-taxes covers only about 
60 percent of emissions. Heavy industries, in particular metallurgical industries and some 
chemical industries, enjoy full exemptions. Emissions from these industries are largely 
unregulated at the present.5 However, a proposal from the expert committee on quotas is 
presently reviewed by the government. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Stortingsproposisjon nr. 54 1997-98; suggested taxation rates were NOK 0,24/kg for coal 
and  NOK 0,34 for coke. 
4 Interview with members of the Norwegian Green Tax Commission, November 1998. 
5 There is a voluntary agreement between the Norwegian aluminium industry and the 
Norwegian government on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases from the aluminium 
industry. The target is to reduce process-based emissions of greenhouse gases by 55 percent 
per ton of aluminium in 2005. However, most of the emission reduction is focused on 
perfluorocarbons, and most emission reduction investments connected to this are profitable 
(Torvanger & Skodvin, 1999, p. 33). 
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Denmark – taxation of all industrial sources 
Denmark is an exceptional case when it comes to taxation of business sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions, as all business sources of emissions are subject to a tax. 
The Danish system of CO2-taxes was initiated in 1993. Then, a tax of DKK 100/tonne of 
CO2 was introduced. However, there were several exemptions. No companies paid more 
than DKK 50/tonne, and energy-intensive industries were exempted. In 1995, a much 
more comprehensive tax package was introduced. From 2000, energy-intensive industries, 
which are defined according to a list of “heavy processes” or according to a complicated 
list of energy costs, are obliged to pay a CO2-tax of DKK 25/tonne CO2. Light industries 
pay DKK 90/tonne CO2 for energy consumed in their production processes (e. g. energy 
consumption from use of office machines or illumination of offices) (Finansministeriet 
1999, p. 30). Both energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive industries may apply for 
negotiated agreements on energy consumption with the government. In this case, taxes 
may be reduced to only DKK 3/tonne of CO2 for energy-intensive industries, and DKK 68 
for non-energy intensive industries (Finansministeriet, 1999, p. 132). 
Danish energy-saving agreements requires companies to do an analysis of their energy-
consumption and submit a report on energy management, including a detailed overview of 
energy-saving options (Enevoldsen and Brendstrup, 2000). This report must be verified by 
an inspector from the Danish Energy Agency (Energistyrelsen). On the basis of their 
report, the companies have to submit an action plan for improved energy management 
(Energistyrelsen, 1999, p. 4).  Branches with uniform energy consumption patterns and 
heavy processes may sign branch agreements with the government (Finansministeriet, 
1999, p. 147). Maximum duration of the agreements is three years (Finansministeriet, 
1999, p. 145). Any failure to meet obligations will be met by cancellation of the agreement 
and an obligation to pay full taxes. In 1999, this had happened in one case 
(Finansministeriet, 1999, p. 149). 
An important aspect of the Danish green tax reform is that companies now have to pay 
full CO2-taxes for room heating. From 1998, companies must pay the same high taxes for 
heating purposes as those paid by ordinary consumers. On average, these taxes are about 
DKK 600/tonne CO2 (Ekins & Speck, 1999, p. 3). 
In addition to the CO2-tax, a SO2-tax of DKK 10/kg SO2 was introduced. The SO2-tax is 
considered as an instrument for reduction of sulphur emissions as well as reduction of 
CO2-emissions, since the tax was introduced to encourage switching of fuels towards less 
sulphur and carbon intensive fuels (University of Kiel, 1998). Without the SO2-tax, it was 
estimated that an effective CO2-tax of DKK 200/tonne would have been necessary to 
achieve the CO2-emission reduction targets identified in the 1995 energy tax package 
(Wageningen, 1998, p. 12). 
Taxes are recycled as reduction of employers’ taxes (60 percent of revenue), special funds 
for energy-saving in industries (24 percent) as well as a special fund for energy-saving in 
small companies (Wageningen, 1998, p. 15). 
 
Short comparison 
When comparing these patterns of exemptions, there is an interesting contrast between 
Denmark on the one hand and Norway and the Netherlands on the other hand. The most 
striking contrast is that in Denmark, in contrast to Norway and the Netherlands, taxes are 
also a main instrument for reducing CO2-emissions from energy intensive industries. 
While energy-intensive industries pay only a very modest tax, they have not been able to 
avoid the tax entirely. Moreover, the Danish agreements have a more compulsory 
character than the Dutch agreements. The government monitoring component gives more 
moderate asymmetries between government and company knowledge about saving 
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potentials, and the agreements are legally binding and bolstered by clear sanctions in case 
the company or branch fails to meet energy efficiency targets. 
It is more difficult to compare the Norwegian and Dutch case in terms of exemptions. 
Some Norwegian energy-intensive industries, most importantly the metal industries, enjoy 
full exemptions from taxes, although the aluminium industry is regulated by a voluntary 
agreement with unknown costs. Thus, Norwegian mainland energy-intensive industries 
enjoy full tax exemptions and very modest regulation through voluntary agreements. 
Dutch energy-intensive industries are also exempted from taxes, but have to meet the 
requirements from the covenants. However, the covenants do not imply concrete 
sanctions in case companies or branches fail to meet their targets. Moreover, in the most 
recent “benchmarking covenants”, energy-saving targets are not specified, and the target 
of being among world leaders in energy-efficiency may be met by using “flexible 
instruments” such as CDM or joint implementation. Unlike in Norway, there are 
considerable funds set aside for financing energy-efficiency investments. Thus, the 
combination of covenants with unclear, non-sanctioned targets and subsidies makes it 
reasonable to categorise Dutch exemptions together with the Norwegian exemptions. 
Both Norwegian and Dutch energy-intensive industries are treated more favourably than 
in Denmark, where energy-intensive industries are taxed, and face more demanding 
energy-efficiency agreements. The question is now: How should this contrast be 
explained? 
4. Why variations in tax exemptions? 
First, I explore the simple hypothesis about the relative economic importance of energy 
intensive industries as a predictor of tax exemptions. The logic behind this argument is 
that states that rely on energy-intensive industries for large shares of national production, 
employment and/or exports are reluctant to tax these industries. Conversely, if energy-
intensive industries are less important governments will have fewer objections against 
taxation as an instrument, as potential losses are perceived as smaller. 
When comparing these three countries, we see that Norway and the Netherlands share a 
highly energy intensive export and industrial structure. In the Netherlands, the industry 
contributed 43 percent of total energy consumption in the Netherlands, and industrial 
sources contributed 27 percent of total CO2-emissions in 1995 (NOVEM, 1999). The 
chemical industry stands out as the chief contributor of CO2-emissions from Dutch 
industry, as it contributed 10 of these 27 percent, or more than a third of industrial CO2-
emissions in 1995 (NOVEM, 1999). The chemical industry alone contributed more than 
32 percent of industrial consumption of energy in 1998.6  
The chemical industry, which has been expanding rapidly during the 1990s, is particularly 
important for industrial production, as it made up 16,5 percent of industrial production in 
1997 in value terms, while it employed about 9 percent of industrial workers the same 
year (Statistics Netherlands, 2000). Chemicals alone contributed 16 percent of the 
country’s exports (Netherlands Foreign Trade Agency, 2000).  Among the sectors 
participating in the long-term agreements, the chemical industry alone contributes 58 
percent of energy consumption (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999, p. 5). Thus, in the 
Dutch case, the use of long-term agreements for energy-intensive industries instead of 
taxes seems well explained by looking at the importance of these industries, especially for 
exports, but also for employment. It is not difficult to understand why decision-makers 
have been especially reluctant to tax such an important industry. 
                                                 
6 Total industrial energy consumption in 1998 was 995 PJ, chemical industry energy 
consumption was 321 PJ in 1998. Source of the first figure is: Statistics Netherlands, 2000, of 
the second figure: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1998, p. 31. 
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Denmark is a strong contrast to the Netherlands in terms of industrial energy 
consumption. In general, the Danish industry is characterised by being a late developed, 
knowledge intensive and highly specialised industry characterised by relatively small 
companies (Det Danske Handelskammer, 2000, Mjøset, 1987, Wageningen, 1998, p. 8). 
Industrial energy consumption in 1998 was 19 percent of total energy consumption  
(Wageningen, 1998), much lower than the Dutch industry’s share of total energy 
consumption. The industry´s contribution to CO2-emissions was 10,1 percent (UNFCCC, 
1999, p.8), less than half of the industrial share of emissions in the Netherlands.  
Moreover, Danish industries do not have any economically important large blocks of 
energy-intensive industries like the Dutch chemical industry. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that the share of industrial energy consumption of companies and branches with 
energy-saving agreements for their industrial processes, which includes virtually every 
energy-intensive company in Denmark, is only 20 percent.7 Industrial energy consumption 
is spread relatively evenly on economic branches, with the biggest industrial branch, food 
processing, also being the biggest energy consumer. Food processing took about 30 
percent of industrial energy consumption in 1995 (Energistyrelsen, 2000). The chemical 
industry, the second highest energy consumer among Danish industries, consumed about 
13 percent of industrial energy consumption in 1995 (Energistyrelsen, 2000). The Danish 
chemical industry differs from the Dutch chemical industry as it is less dominated by 
energy-intensive base chemicals and more focused on pharmaceuticals and other 
knowledge intensive products. Energy intensive products do not in any way dominate 
Danish exports (Det Danske Handelskammer, 2000). 
Norway’s industry is traditionally highly energy intensive. The industrial segment called 
“energy-intensive” industries is the main reason for this. Including base chemicals and 
production of ferro-alloys, aluminium and other metals, this industrial segment 
contributed about 51 percent of industrial energy consumption in 1998 (Statistics Norway, 
2000). These industries also dominate emissions of CO2 from Norwegian industry. 
Although they use hydro-electric power as main energy input, the metal industries, which 
is the most important sub-segment of the energy-intensive industries, consume coal and 
coke in their production processes. In 1996, the metal industries emitted 4,853 million 
tonnes of CO2 or 11,7 percent of total emissions of CO2 in Norway.8  CO2 –emissions from 
the metal industries contributed more than 40 percent of industrial CO2 –emissions in 
1996 (Statistics Norway, 2000). 
The metal industry is not very important economically. In 1996, the metal industry 
contributed 1,1 percent of GDP and 9,6 percent of total exports (Godal, 1998: 13). The 
metallurgical industry employed less than 20.000 or less than 1 percent of the total labour 
force in the early 1990s (Godal, 1998, p. 9, Statistics Norway, 2000) Employment has 
been decreasing since the 1970s (Godal, 1998, p. 9). Still, this industry remained untaxed 
throughout the 1990s, while the much larger and more economically important petroleum 
exploration industry, which contributed 37,8 percent of total exports and almost 15 
percent of GDP in 1996, had to pay a substantial CO2-tax on their emissions from flaring 
of natural gas on the continental shelf (Statistics Norway, 2000). 
Thus, hypotheses focused on the economic importance of emission intensive industries do 
not seem to be able to explain the particular Norwegian pattern of tax exemptions. 
Mainland emission-intensive industries of moderate economic importance remain 
untaxed, while the big off-shore petroleum exploration industry has to pay substantial 
CO2-taxes. 
                                                 
7 Calculated on the basis of information from Statistics Denmark, 2000, and Finansministeriet 
(1999:149). 
8 Calculated on the basis of Godal (1998, p. 7) and Statistics Norway (2000). 
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To understand this pattern of exemptions in Norway, we have to turn to political 
explanations. In Norway, the mainland emission-intensive industries are exceptionally 
powerful for at least two reasons. 
First, these industries are located in the scarcely populated Norwegian countryside, close 
to hydroelectric power stations (Godal, 1998). Due to the Norwegian election system, 
rural votes count more than urban votes in Parliamentary elections (Rokkan, 1967). 
Second, these industries have a privileged relationship to Norwegian trade unions and the 
Labour Party. The Labour Party has historically been the main agent behind the 
establishment of these industries (Slagstad, 1999). The metal industries were established as 
part of a government-led industrialisation project during the 1940s and 1950s (Slagstad, 
1999, Kasa, forthcoming). The business-oriented Conservative Party (Høyre) is also a 
long-standing supporter of these industries (Slagstad, 1999).  
In contrast, the offshore petroleum companies operate in a recently established sector 
which, just because it is offshore, has no link to the important regional dimension of 
Norwegian politics. Moreover, offshore petroleum production has a high presence of 
foreign multinationals which makes it much easier for the government to legitimise these 
as targets of taxation. 
During the 1990s, the energy-intensive mainland industries were able to exploit its 
political resources to persuade Labour and the Conservative Party to shelve any proposal 
to extend the CO2-tax to include the metal industries. The main organisational vehicles for 
this campaign were the main employers’ organisation NHO and the biggest trade union 
LO (Reitan, 1998b, Kasa, forthcoming). These organisations are strongly influenced by 
their heavy industry sub-organisations. Even when the new centre coalition government in 
1998 proposed a green tax reform that involved reductions of employers’ taxes along with 
an extended CO2-tax, the heavy industry interests within both organisations prevailed 
over less polluting labour intensive branches that would benefit from a reduced 
employers’ tax (Kasa, forthcoming). Thus, the minority centre government was defeated in 
the Norwegian Parliament, and a quota commission was instead initiated. Given the 
described political networks and prevailing political signals, it is highly likely that the final 
decision on a quota system in Norway will imply that “grandfathered” quotas will be 
distributed to energy-intensive industries.  
It is interesting to contrast the Norwegian case with Denmark. Also in Denmark, energy 
intensive industries were active against the CO2-tax. However, the main employers’ 
organisation, Dansk Industri, was not able to push coherently for exemptions for energy-
intensive companies as energy-extensive companies make up a larger proportion of the 
member companies and are more powerful than in Norway (Pedersen, forthcoming). 
Other employers’ organisations like the Chamber of Danish Trades and Crafts, the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Danish Commerce and Service were in fact 
moderately positive to a pervasive CO2-tax (Enevoldsen & Brendstrup, 2000).  
Similarly, the Danish Labour Party was less dominated by heavy industries and more 
strongly influenced by pro-environmental groups. The party did not have the same “heavy 
industry” heritage as its Norwegian counterpart, among other factors due to the fact that 
workers in labour intensive industries have a higher union membership in Denmark than 
in Norway (Scheuer, 1998). The Danish Labour Party therefore became a proponent of a 
CO2-tax that included energy-intensive industries (Pedersen, forthcoming).  
In the Netherlands, it is interesting to note that the biggest trade union, the FNV, came 
out as a supporter of a CO2-tax that included energy-intensive industries. As workers in 
labour intensive industries and the service sector increasingly dominated union 
membership, the organisation perceived a broadening of the CO2-tax as beneficial for 
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most of its members.9 However, energy intensive industries seem to have enjoyed more 
influence over the very powerful employers’ unions as well as the Liberal Party. It is 
unlikely that the Liberal Party, the main opponent to the Dutch regulatory energy tax, 
could have accepted a tax that also included energy-intensive companies only to appease 
its coalition partners (Ligteringen 1999, p. 271).   
5. Conclusion 
It is interesting to note that explanations of tax exemptions focusing on economic and 
political costs connected to regulation in the three cases seem to be complimentary rather 
than competitive. The Norwegian pattern of tax exemptions seems to present the most 
clear-cut example of the explanatory importance of the political resources of industry 
organisations. It is impossible to understand the contrast between the taxation of the 
economically very important petroleum exploration companies and the much less 
important metal industries without taking into account special characteristics of 
Norwegian regional and industrial policy as well as Norwegian trade- and employers’ 
unions.  
The outcome in the Dutch case seems more easily understandable in terms of economic 
costs. The giant size of the Dutch chemical industries and their importance especially for 
exports makes the government’s fear of economic losses connected to taxation more 
understandable. However, there were also important political factors that contributed to 
the outcome in the Dutch case. In clear contrast to Norwegian trade unions, Dutch trade 
unions came out in defence of taxing energy-intensive industries, but they enjoyed less 
influence over government decision-making than their Norwegian counterpart. Instead, 
the traditional domination of employers’ unions within Dutch “employer-led corporatism” 
(Visser, 1998) seems to have increased the influence of the energy-intensive industries on 
decision-making.  
Moreover, the Dutch political culture and policy style has undoubtedly worked in favour 
of a compromise that included exemptions . The complexity of the process of reaching a 
solution on the green tax issue reflects a political culture where compromise and 
consensus prevails over economic efficiency as leading principles of decision-making. 
Thus, political factors have supplemented and strengthened the effect of economic 
importance in the Dutch case. 
Economic structure seems to have been of high importance in explaining the more 
moderate exemptions in the Danish case. The low importance of energy-intensive 
industries in Danish industrial production and exports seems to be an important key to 
understand the comparatively less favourable treatment of these industries. Denmark’s 
large share of energy-extensive industries and services seems to have paved the way for a 
more economically and environmentally effective green tax system. The economic 
structure was reflected in organisational mobilisation as Danish employers’ organisations 
were unable to form a united and coherent position against taxation of emission-intensive 
companies. 
However, when analysing economic costs as a motive for exemptions, it should be 
remarked that many of the economic costs are perceived costs and not necessarily real 
costs (Daugbjerg, 1998b, p. 279). Both in Norway and the Netherlands, politicians have 
tended to accept industry threats about transfer of production in case of regulation. The 
fact that Norwegian and Dutch energy-intensive industries benefit from favourable energy 
                                                 




prices not found many other places has not received much attention in the national 
debates on environmental taxation (Arentsen, undated, Kasa, forthcoming). 
Environmental taxes are only one of a multitude of factors that influence decisions on 
company location. A modest environmental tax is in most cases not enough to cause 
widespread bankruptcies in polluting industrial branches as illustrated by the Danish case.  
A second problem related to using the size and economic importance of the emission-
intensive industries as a cause of exemptions is simply that the causal mechanism to a 
large extent may be the opposite. In Norway, it is known that the power of emission-
intensive industries has been a key to their continuous expansion. One important 
outcome of of this is the favourable energy price that has boosted emission-intensive 
industries ( Kasa, forthcoming). In Norway, metal industries have enjoyed preferential 
access to key political decision-makers in the whole post-war period (Kasa, forthcoming, 
Midttun 1988). Dutch energy-intensive industries have also benefited from comparatively 
low energy prices. They are generally seen as having strong influence on decision-
making.10 However, there is a notable lack of research on the power and influence of 
these industries, perhaps reflecting the Dutch consensus- and solution-oriented style of 
policy-making.11 
Thus, even analyses based on the costs of taxation may involve such political factors as 
policy-makers interpretation of costs as well as the simple fact that the emergence of a 
emission-intensive industrial structure may reflect the political power of some emission 
intensive companies. These factors should be kept in mind when exemptions from 




Arentsen, M. (undated): “Dutch style of climate policy”, mimeo. Twente: University of 
Twente. 
Crepaz, M. M. L. (1995): “Explaining national variations of air pollution levels: political 
institutions and their impact on environmental policy-making”, Environmental 
Politics, 4(3), 391-415. 
Daugbjerg, C. (1998a): “Similar problems, different policies: policy networks and 
environmental policy in Danish and Swedish agriculture”, in Marsh, D. (ed.) 
Comparing Policy Networks, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Daugbjerg, C. (1998b): “Power and Policy Design: A Comparison of Green Taxation in  
Scandinavian Agriculture”, Scandinavian Political Studies, 21 (3), pp. 253-283. 
Det Danske Handelskammer (2000): A Business Guide to Denmark. Website of Det 
Danske Handelskammer:  http://www.danishexporters.dk/export/html/economy.asp 
EEA (1996): Environmental Taxes. Implementation and Environmental Effectiveness, 
Copenhagen: European Environmental Agency. 
Enevoldsen, Martin and Stefan Brendstrup (2000):  "Considering Feasibility and 
Efficiency: The Danish Mix of CO2 Taxes and Agreements", in Andersen, M. S. and R. 
                                                 
10 Interviews with Dutch NGOs and energy policy experts February 2000. 
11 Interviews with Dutch NGOs and energy policy experts February 2000. 
 15
U. Sprenger (eds.): Market-based Instruments for Environmental Management: 
Politics and Institutions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Ekins, P. & S. Speck (1999): “Competitiveness and Exemptions from Environmental 
Taxes in Europe”, in Environmental and Resource Economics, 23(4), pp. 369-396. 
Energistyrelsen (1999): Vejledning om indgåelse af aftale om energieffektivisering – 
overgangsordning. Energistyrelsen: http://www.ens.dk/tilskud/co2/vejl/vejlaft.htm. 
Energistyrelsen (2000): Energistyrelsen. Website: http://www.ens.dk/index.asp. 
Enevoldsen, M. (2000), ”Industrial Energy Efficiency”, in Mol, A. P., V. Lauber and J.D. 
Liefferink (eds.): The Voluntary Approach to Environmental Policy: Joint 
Environmental Policy-Making in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Finansministeriet (1999): Evaluering af grønne afgifter og erhvervene, København: 
Finansministeriet. 
Glasbergen, P. (1998): “Partnership as a Learning Process: Environmental Covenants in 
the Netherlands”, in Glasbergen, P.(ed.): Co-operative Environmental Governance: 
Public-Private Agreements as a Policy Strategy, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Godal, O. (1998): Metallindustrien i Norge: Økonomi, sysselsetting og utslipp av 
klimagasser. Oslo: Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, 
CICERO Policy Note 1998:2. 
Howlett, M. (1991): “Policy Instruments, Policy Styles and Policy Implementation: 
National Approaches to Theories of Instrument Choice”, Policy Studies Journal, 
19(2), Spring, pp. 1-21. 
Kasa, S. (forthcoming): Policy networks as barriers to green tax reform: The case of CO2-
taxes in Norway, fully accepted and under publication by Environmental Politics. 
Midttun, A. (1988): ”The negotiated political economy of a heavy industrial sector: the 
Norwegian hydropower complex in the 1970s and 1980s”, Scandinavian Political 
Studies, 11(2), s. 115-143. 
Ministerie van Finanzen (Dutch Ministry of Finance) (1999): Wijzingen in de 
belastingsheffing met ingang van 1 Januari 2000,  Persberichtnr. 99/300, Den Haag: 
Ministerie van Finanzen. 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (1999): Long-term agreements on energy-efficiency. Progress 
in 1998, Den Haag: Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
Mjøset, L. (1987): “Nordic Economic Policies in the 1970s and 1980s”, International 
Organization, 41(3) pp. 403-456. 
Netherlands Foreign Trade Agency (2000): Publications of the Netherlands Foreign Trade 
Agency, Netherlands Foreign Trade Agency website: 
http://www.hollandtrade.com/ 
NOVEM (1999): The Netherlands. Facts and figures on energy and environment. 
Distributed by NOVEM on their homepage: http://novem.org/ in 1999. 
OECD (1997): Environmental Taxes and Green Tax Reform, Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Pedersen, L. H. (forthcoming): Miljøøkonomiske ideer i en energipolitisk virkelighed - 
indførelsen af CO2-afgifter på erhvervene. København:AKF-forlaget. 
Reitan, M. (1998a), ’Ecological Modernisation and ”Realpolitik”: Ideas, Interests and 
Institutions’, Environmental Politics, 7(2), pp.1-26. 
 16
 
Reitan, M. (1998b), Interesser og institusjoner i miljøpolitikken. Ph. D. Dissertation. Oslo: 
Insitutt for Statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo. 
Ringius (1999): “Differentiation, Leaders and Fairness: Negotiating Climate Commitments 
in the European Community”, International Negotiations, 4(2), pp. 364-385. 
Rokkan, S. (1967), “Geography, religion and social class; Crosscutting cleavages in 
Norwegian Politics” in Lipset, S.M. & S. Rokkan (eds.): Party systems and voter 
alignments. Cross-national perspectives, New York, The Free Press. 
Scheuer, S. (1998) “Denmark – a less regulated model” in Ferner, A. & R. Hyman (ed): 
Changing Industrial Relations in Europe,. Oxford, Blackwell. 
Slagstad, R. (1999), De nasjonale strateger, Oslo: Pax. 
Speck, S. (1999) Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications, Energy 
Policy 27(11), pp. 659-667. 
Sprinz, D. and T. Vaahoranta (1994): “The interest-based explanation of international 
environmental policy.” International Organization, 48(1), pp. 77-106. 
Statistics, Netherlands (2000): Homepage of Statistics, Netherlands: http://www.cbs.nl/ 
Statistics, Norway (2000): Homepage for Statistics, Norway: http://www.ssb.no/ 
Stortingsproposisjon Nr. 54 1997-98. 
Torvanger, A. & T. Skodvin (1999): Implementing the Kyoto Protocol. The Role of 
Environmental Agreements, Report 1999:4, Oslo: Center for International Climate 
and Environmental Research. 
UNFCCC(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change secretariat)(1999): 
Denmark. Report on the in-depth review of the second national communication of 
Denmark, UNFCCC website: http://www.unfccc.de. 
University of Kiel (1998): Interdisciplinary Analysis of Successful Implementation of 
Energy Efficiency in the Industrial, Commercial and  Service Sector. Final Report. Vol 
11: Documentation of Case Studies: Chapter 1: The Danish CO2-tax on Trade and 
Industry, University of Kiel: http://www.psychologie.uni-
kiel.de/nordlicht/sme/b1.htm 
Visser, J. (1998): “The Netherlands: The Return of Responsive Corporatism”, in Ferner, A. 
& R. Hyman (eds.): Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, Oxford: Blackwell. 
VROM (Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment) (2000): The 
Regulatory Energy Tax in the Netherlands – Questions and Answers, Den Haag: 
VROM. 
Weale, A. (1992), The new politics of pollution, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
